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banks. Such banks are left free to voluntarily join the Federal Reserve System if they so desire, but they are not compelled to comply with the System's requirements as provided in S. 1298.

Thank you for your consideration of our request that the enclosed draft bill be introduced in the Senate.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES R. MCNEILL,
Director, Washington Office.

CONVEYANCE OF CERTAIN LANDS
IN OKLAHOMA

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, for myself and my senior colleague from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY], I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to provide for the conveyance of the so-called scattered tracts in Oklahoma, acquired under the act of June 26, 1936—49 Stat. 1967.

The need for this legislation was brought to my attention by Mr. Charlie Flute, of Marble City, Okla., during a recent task force trip to four counties in eastern Oklahoma by various Federal officials, Senator MIKE MONRONEY, Representative ED EDMONDSON, and me.

The Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of June 26, 1936, authorized the Secretary of Interior to acquire interest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to lands then owned by Indians which were being used for agricultural and grazing purposes. It also provided that the lands should be held in trust by the United States, and during such time, they should be tax free, except for a gross production tax to be collected by the State of Oklahoma.

The bill I introduce today would authorize the Secretary of Interior to give clear title of this land, including mineral deposits, to the life tenant or his heirs. It is left up to the Secretary of Interior to determine whether or not the deed shall provide that the land be free of restrictions and its tax-exempt status or subject to restrictions and its continued tax-exempt status.

Mr. President, I am hopeful that appropriate action will be taken on this legislation at the earliest possible date. I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed at this point in the Record, together with a letter I received from Mr. Earl Boyd Pierce, addressed to Representative ED EDMONDSON, who is general counsel of the Cherokee Nation, and other letters.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill and letters will be printed in the Record.

The bill (S. 2520) to provide for the conveyance of so-called scattered tracts in Oklahoma, acquired under the act of June 26, 1936 (49 Stat. 1967), introduced by Mr. HARRIS (for himself and Mr. MONRONEY), was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

S. 2520

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to convey to the life tenant, his heirs, devisees, successors, or assigns, title to

the entire interest in lands and improvements thereon, including mineral deposits, that were acquired by the United States in trust for a designated individual Indian for his lifetime and thereafter in trust for the Tribe, pursuant to the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of June 26, 1936 (49 Stat. 1967): Provided, That the Secretary shall determine in each instance, that it is in the best interest of the intended grantee to convey, and the deed shall so provide, such land either (a) free of restrictions and its tax-exempt status, or (b) subject to restrictions against alienation and its continued tax-exempt status as provided under such Act of June 26, 1936.

The letters presented by Mr. HARRIS are as follows:

MUSKOGEE, OKLA., April 3, 1967.

Hon. ED EDMONDSON,
Member of Congress,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR ED: Immediately following the closing of the Task Force Meeting in Tahlequah, Mr. Virgil Harrington suggested that I make an effort to solve the Charlie Flute land problem.

Mr. Flute and his Mother, Mrs. Mollie Flute, came to the office early this morning and with maps, relevant Bureau letters and other documents completely clarified the title picture. Later Mrs. Merz Schroeder, an extremely able attorney with the Bureau and Tahlequah Superintendent, Johnny Walker, arrived with the "Flute File" giving more exact information concerning the history of the title in question. Attached hereto is a photostat copy of the Bureau letter dated March 14, 1956, addressed to Mr. Flute spelling out the essential facts, except that the land description constituted the original allotment of Charlie's Grandmother, Esther Flute, Full Blood Cherokee, Roll Number 25718, now deceased. The Government paid the taxes on the land described in the Bureau letter on January 14, 1942, and by separate Deeds, in each case from the Grandmother Esther, approved title was conveyed as shown in said letter to the individuals, all of whom were Full Blood Cherokees, fee title being placed in the United States in Trust for each individual, during life time, then in Trust for the Tribe, "until such time as the use of the land is assigned by the Secretary" to either "a cooperative group" or to an individual Indian, and then "in Trust for such group or individual". Some of this language employed in the granting clause was authorized by the Act of June 26, 1936 (49 Stat. 1967).

In any event it is plain that under the granting clause of the Grandmother, the Secretary was given authority at the instant of Mr. Flute's death to bypass the Cherokee Tribe, as a remainderman, and place the beneficial use of the property directly and immediately in either a cooperative group or in an individual Indian, at the discretion of the Secretary.

Thus, Mrs. Schroeder and I have agreed that Congress alone has the authority to dispose of lands where the title is held in the United States, and it is believed that the attached proposed Bill, if enacted, will enable Mr. Flute and all other Cherokees similarly situated to receive, if the Secretary so determines, a restricted fee title along with exemption from ad valorem taxes. Mr. Flute's case, and I am satisfied that there are a few others in the same situation, would certainly justify the consideration afforded to him by this proposed Bill. At least the discretion is left with the Secretary as to both items, and we are assured that with the passage of the Bill Mr. Flute will have no trouble obtaining adequate credit from either the Bureau or the Tribe, sufficient to satisfy his housing and other reasonable needs. Both Mrs. Schroeder and Mr. Walker share these views.

We understand that there is a particular urgency about this matter and that it was Mr. Harrington's wish that the Bill be sent immediately to you with copies to our Senators, provided Mrs. Schroeder was satisfied with the proposal.

It is understood, of course, that the Departments will be called upon for reports and if by chance any important legal points have been overlooked the same will be corrected by the experts in the Departments. We understood that the Task Force would be intolerant of any unusual delay in bringing to Mr. Charlie Flute positive and effective relief. My personal expression of gratification for the timely appearance and good work of the Task Force will come later.

Sincerely yours,

EARL BOYD PIERCE,
General Counsel,
Cherokee Nation.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Muskogee, Okla., March 14, 1956.

Mr. CHARLIE FLUTE,
Rt. 1, Bunch, Okla.

DEAR CHARLIE: On our last Field Day in Sallisaw, you requested that we send you descriptions and plats of land deeded to the United States in Trust for Charlie, Johnnie Mack, Nancy, Bettie, Sarah, Thomas and Homer Flute. The land is described below:

	Acres
Charlie Flute: Lot 2 and SW NE of sec. 1-13-23	80
Johnnie Mack: Lots 3 and 4 and SE NW sec. 1-13-23	120
Nancy Flute now Christie: Lot 1 and SE NE and N2 NE SE 1-13N-23	100
Homer Flute: NW NE of sec. 12-13N-23	40
Homer Flute: W2 NW of sec. 11-13N-23	80
Bettie Flute: S2 NE and E2 SE sec. 10-13N-23	160
Sarah Flute: NW of sec. 10-13N-23	160
Thomas Flute: N2 SW and NE SE SW and NW SW SE, sec. 12-13-23	100
Thomas Flute: NE NE SE and NW NE SE sec. 11-13N-23E	20
Total acres	860

You also requested a description of the land of John Flute, Jr., Cherokee #25719. His land is described as: E2 SW and W2 SE of sec. 11-13N-23E, 160 acres.

You asked whether or not the land, that had been deeded in Trust to you children is deeded to the United States in Trust for people can be sold by issuing a (Patent in Fee.) Your Deeds do not come under this. They state: To the United States in Trust for "You Flutes" named above, during his lifetime, then in Trust for the Cherokee Tribe of Oklahoma." This means, that all you have is a Life estate in the land, described opposite your names, then the land reverts to the Cherokee Tribe at your death.

We are enclosing 4 small plats of the above described land and 1 large plat showing all the land.

If there is anything further that we can do for you, please advise us.

Sincerely yours,

H. NICHOLSON,
Field Representative.

HN:hm

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING—
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and Senators BREWSTER, HART, HATFIELD, JAVITS, McGEE, MCGOVERN, MONDALE, MORSE, YOUNG of Ohio, and PERCY, I submit a concurrent resolution dealing with the subject of United Na-

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tions peacekeeping and peacemaking, and ask that it be appropriately referred.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The concurrent resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, under the rule, the concurrent resolution will be printed in the RECORD.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 47) was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, as follows:

S. CON. RES. 47

Whereas Congress has urged that there should be developed permanent organization and procedures to enable the United Nations promptly to employ suitable United Nations forces for such purposes as observation and patrol in situations that may threaten international peace and security (H. Con. Res. 373, Eighty-fifth Congress, second session); and

Whereas the need for such forces has been demonstrated by past experience and will be even greater in the future; and

Whereas United Nations impartial peacekeeping forces will continue to be a major instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress reaffirms its support for United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking and urges:

(a) That, as an immediate objective, the United States Government—

(1) encourage and support the earmarking and specialized training of units by United Nations member states for employment in United Nations peacekeeping operations;

(2) be prepared to make available to the United Nations transport, communications and logistical personnel and facilities; and,

(3) be prepared to advocate or support on all appropriate occasions proposals for guidelines to govern the financing, training, equipping, and duration of peacekeeping forces for effective use, as well as guidelines to govern concomitant machinery for peacemaking where peacekeeping forces are in use.

(b) That, as part of the long-range development of the United Nations as a more effective instrument for building and keeping peace, the United States Government encourage and support the creation of a permanent, individually recruited force under United Nations command for impartial peacekeeping duties.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the recent crisis in the Middle East focused attention once again on the role of U.N. forces in preventing international conflict. Debate on the rationale of the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. troops continues. But underlying all debate is the recognition that first, a U.N. force is a vital component in the effort to develop effective machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes; and second, that there is a critical need to develop sound rules for the effective use of U.N. forces.

Much has been said about the unwisdom of the United States assuming the role of "policeman of the world." I agree that the United States cannot and should not assume such a role. But what are the alternatives? Some say the United States should intervene unilaterally wherever the peace is threatened; some say that a return to isolationism is the only answer. But neither extreme is appropriate in today's world of rapid transportation and instant communication, where the possibility of worldwide nuclear holocaust looms large whenever there is a disruption of the peace at any point on the globe.

By taking initiatives within the United Nations, I believe the United States can fulfill its responsibilities to the maintenance of world peace in a way properly fitting our role as the world's most powerful nation by providing specific recommendations for the creation of a permanent U.N. peace force with rules to guide its effective use and financing.

Under the present system, as we have seen, U.N. forces are pulled together on an ad hoc basis in the heat of conflict with confused regulations as to their use, and their existence may be abruptly terminated just when they are most needed. Indeed, it is a wonder that they have been as successful as they have been. Certainly, the time has come to take a hard look at what can be done to assure the development of an effective arm of enforcement for the principles contained in article I of the United Nations Charter.

As a minimal step in this direction, I have submitted the Senate concurrent resolution which I have just sent to the desk. Its companion measure, House Concurrent Resolution 130 and 131, has already been introduced in the other body by 63 Representatives.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing of the bill (S. 2321) to supplement the antitrust laws of the United States in order to prevent anticompetitive practices, by providing for just compensation upon termination of certain franchise relationships, the name of the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. NELSON] be added as a cosponsor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY], I ask unanimous consent that, at its next printing, the names of the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and the Senator from Oregon [Mr. HATFIELD] be added to the bill (S. 2394) to amend the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act with respect to the labeling of packages of cigarettes, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President on behalf of the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY], I ask unanimous consent that, at its next printing, the name of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. HATFIELD] be added as a cosponsor of the bill (S. 2395) to direct the Federal Communications Commission to establish regulations prohibiting certain broadcasting of advertising of cigarettes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY], I ask unanimous consent that the name of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. HATFIELD] be added as a cosponsor of the bill (S. 2396) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to tax cigarettes on the basis of their tar and nicotine content.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL CONFEREES ON H.R. 11456

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, as chairman of the Subcommittee on the Department of Transportation, of the Committee on Appropriations, I ask unanimous consent that the following named Senators be added as conferees on the part of the Senate to the conference to be held on the bill (H.R. 11456) making appropriations for the Department of Transportation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes: The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONROE], and the Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. FULBRIGHT:

Article entitled "Military-Industrial Complex," written by Joseph C. Harsch, and published in the Christian Science Monitor of October 4, 1967.

Article entitled "A General in Arms," an interview of Gen. James M. Gavin by Emmet John Hughes, published in Newsweek magazine for October 16, 1967.

NE file
WHAT DO WE DO ABOUT THE ARABS?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it was with interest that I read an article in the September 1 issue of Fortune magazine, by an old friend and a very excellent reporter, Mr. Dan Cordtz. The article is entitled "But What Do We Do About the Arabs?"

I believe it would be worthwhile for the Senate to give the article due consideration, because of the difficulties which exist, which have existed, and which may well exist in the Middle East for some time to come, so that collectively as well as individually we may achieve a better understanding of the problem.

I ask unanimous consent that this pertinent piece of information be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BUT WHAT DO WE DO ABOUT THE ARABS?
(By Dan Cordtz)

(NOTE.—The strategic importance of the Middle East to the world's industrial nations often gets overlooked in close-in debate over the Israeli-Arab war. In the first three articles of this issue FORTUNE assesses the high stakes involved in terms of people, geography, and—by no means least—oil.)

Two decades ago, in the eyes of nearly all Arabs, the U.S. towered over every other major power. Today America is a curse on the lips of many of the most intelligent and moderate in their ranks. "At this moment,"

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claims an embittered Princeton-educated former Jordanian minister, "there is no Arab more extreme than the other. What I say about the U.S. is being said by every Kuwaiti, Saudi, or Libyan. Like Churchill, we are ready to make an alliance with the devil to keep ourselves alive." An American historian declares flatly that "not since the Boxer Rebellion has there been as rapid and ubiquitous a revulsion against a foreign power as there has been against the U.S. in the Middle East." And a man who once helped formulate our Arab policy sadly acknowledges that "our ability to play a role in that region has never been less than it is today."

This gloomy assessment is shared by many well-informed people in the U.S.—in government and outside. Some knowledgeable specialists in the State Department are very concerned about the precipitous decline in our influence. So are the most respected academic experts on the Middle East and, when they are willing to discuss it, American businessmen with interests and long experience in the Arab lands. Their fears, together with the outrage and despair of Arabs who were once among America's closest friends, suggest the time has come for a realistic, full-scale reappraisal of our objectives in the Arab world, their priorities, and the means by which they can best be attained.

The stakes are great, and go far beyond our obvious interest in the safety of Israel. In a world of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Middle East has lost some of its historic value as a strategic geographic area. Some, but not all. For the region is still the fastest, cheapest transportation route—by air or sea—between Western Europe and Asia. And still more important, beneath its desert sands, lie close to 300 billion barrels of petroleum, about three-fourths of the non-Communist world's proved reserves. Daily production of the Arab wells total more than nine million barrels. According to oil consultant Walter Levy, the complete loss of this oil could not be made up by any combination of other sources within a decade—if at all. Western Europe imports 5,600,000 barrels of Arab oil each day, 65 percent of its requirements, and Japan 1,200,000 (60 percent). If the Russians should achieve domination of the Arab countries, as many Arabs now fear they will, they could blackmail both Western Europe and Japan by threatening to turn off the taps and cripple their economies. The ultimate price for assured oil supplies, some American diplomats grimly speculate, could well be a sharp diminution of U.S. influence in Europe and Asia.

The major goal of most of our efforts in the Middle East is to keep that from happening. There are serious doubts today that we are succeeding. The Communist camel poked his nose under the tent in 1955 when Egyptian President Nasser, rebuffed by the U.S., turned to Czechoslovakia for weapons. In the years since, the beast has steadily made new encroachments. None of the Arab countries can yet be labeled Red satellites, but the Russian gains have been impressive and worrisome. In Syria, where a series of coups d'etat has wiped out layer on layer of educated leaders and many of those who remain are leftist, the army is Russian equipped and largely directed by Soviet advisers. Egypt, its economy almost bankrupt and its expensive military machine shattered, is more dependent than ever on Russian assistance. Two years after the elimination of Premier Ben Bella, Algeria still truculently proclaims its close friendship with Russia. And these are three of the weightiest Arab nations.

Underlying elements of strength remain to us: only recently escaped from colonial rule, the Arabs are not anxious to hand over their independence; even Nasser has kept local Communists under control and has moved quietly to restore communication with the U.S. And Communism, as an ideol-

ogy, is incompatible with the Arabs' dominant Islamic faith. That said, though, reemergence of the dormant Arab-Israeli conflict has so polarized Middle Eastern politics that there is danger that nearly all the Arab countries will ally themselves with the Soviet Union in opposition to Israel and its protector, the U.S. Anti-Communist Arabs frantically warn that this is already happening. According to a Lebanese statesman whose pro-Western credentials are beyond reproach, "The U.S. must ask itself this central question: 'Are we ready to hand over the Middle East to the Russians?'"

Measured against the U.S. Government's own formally enunciated goals, our present approach can hardly be termed a rousing success. We have failed to keep the Russians out or under control. We were unable to prevent an outbreak of hostilities. The Suez Canal is closed once more. Continued access to the oil, on acceptable terms, remains in doubt. It can even be argued that Israel's long-term security and prosperity, far from being enhanced, are today in greater jeopardy.

Some of these aims, it must be conceded, are so ambitious as to be almost unrealistic; perhaps no policy devised by human ingenuity can ever attain them all. Washington officials warn that "the first thing to remember is that we aren't God." One observes: "We found out in this latest Middle Eastern crisis that even we and the Soviets together couldn't give orders and expect people to snap their heels and come to attention." There is much to this. The Arab world is not a "world" but a sprawling, diffuse collection of thirteen states with little in common but language. Our goals there are sometimes contradictory, as we seek to remain friendly with states antagonistic to one another. Our tools are limited: our military strength is unusable, our aid programs are hedged with restrictions demanded by Congress, and persuasion is often ineffective. In a sense, moreover, our efforts are subject to a double veto: Israel and its supporters can establish one boundary to our policy, and the oil-producing Arab states another.

THE LOUD, PERSUASIVE VOICE

The U.S. is actually confronted with two different though related sets of problems. The first, ever present in the background and at times totally overshadowing the other, arises out of our very special friendship with Israel. Virtually all the Arab countries' leaders came to power after Israel's establishment, and therefore began relations with the U.S. tacitly accepting our close ties with the Jewish state we had helped create. While the Middle East is quiet those ties can usually be ignored in the interests of cooperation. But when periodically the two sides clash, as they did over passage through the Gulf of Aqaba, U.S. support of Israel produces a poisonous Arab reaction.

The second group of complications have their origin in the frequently waspish relations among the Arab nations themselves. For a number of years this has really meant relations of each of the other nations with Nasser. Other regimes must come to grips with the Egyptian leader because he is, however much they may deplore it, the most popular political leader in the Arab world and the only Arab to whom both the big powers pay much attention. And he has evinced ambitions about his and Egypt's role in the Arab world that almost inevitably pose threats to leaders of the oil-producing lands, where are greatest material interests lie.

Nasser appears to be aiming for eventual unification of the Arab world under his domination. Part of his motivation is probably personal ambition. But he also seems to persuade millions that the welfare of Egypt and even the other Arabs will thereby be served. Wealth and population are un-

evenly distributed in the Middle East; Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya have lots of oil and few people, while Egypt is poor and crowded. Thus a combination, Nasser believes, would benefit everyone. And the region's political power, he reasons, would be enhanced if it spoke on the world stage with one voice. In his efforts, though, Nasser has run afoul of the nationalist aspirations of other Arab rulers, who are unwilling to submit to his leadership. While his appeal to the masses is great and extends to literally all of the Arab lands, he is regarded as a threat by many of their leaders—especially King Hussein of Jordan, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, King Hassan of Morocco, and President Bourguiba of Tunisia.

In his drive to unify and lead the Arabs, Nasser has tried a number of different tactics. He joined with Syria and, later in 1958, Yemen, to form the United Arab Republic, then sadly watched its dissolution three years later after a Syrian Army revolt. He has been accused by other Arab chieftains of plotting to overthrow or assassinate them. He has employed Radio Cairo to pour out a steady stream of vilification on those who opposed him. He intervened in Yemen's civil war to gain a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula and to ensure a friendly regime in Aden when the British depart. More recently, of course, he used the tension of the confrontation with Israel to force Hussein into a military pact. None of these stratagems has really been successful. From time to time, disappointed and chastened, Nasser retires behind his own borders vowing to concentrate on Egypt's internal economic problems. But an American acquaintance suggests that those problems are so staggering that Nasser can bear to look at them for only six months or so and then begins longing again for his old foreign adventures.

The official U.S. attitude toward Nasser has swung wildly from ardent cultivation to near-ostracism. A former government official who knows the Egyptian president well contends that we have always handled him exactly wrong—wooing him when we should have been firm and hitting him too hard when the wooing didn't work. Thus in the early days of the Kennedy Administration, he suggests, we were overgenerous in granting aid to Egypt, then too precipitate in withdrawing it four years later when Nasser displeased us. Egyptian resentment was heightened by the fact that in the year before withdrawal 98 percent of the aid was food, which made it appear that we were condemning Egypt's poor to starvation out of spite.

There are those who believe, however, that we had lost any hope of getting along with Nasser long before that. They label the Israeli raid on the Gaza Strip in February, 1955, the beginning of the end. Nasser was appalled to discover, when the Israeli troops poured into Gaza, that they could just as easily have swept on to Cairo. He demanded that the U.S. sell him arms to counterbalance the Israeli strength. After months of unsuccessful haggling, he announced a deal with the Czechs for weapons in amounts and varieties far greater than anything he had asked from the U.S. In July, 1956, President Eisenhower, Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, retaliated by backing down on commitments to help build the high dam at Aswan. A week later Nasser seized the Suez Canal, and three months after that Israel, Britain, and France invaded Egypt. Ultimately, of course, the U.S. played a major role in forcing the invaders out. But Dulles' legalistic rationalizations fanned little warmth in Egyptian breasts; some Egyptians blame us for bringing about the crisis in the first place.

In our dealings with other Arab countries, we have always been influenced by the thought of Nasser in the background. Thus we have quickly cooled to Arabs who seemed to share Nasser's radical aims: Syria, the

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Yemeni Republicans, sometimes Iraq. And we have been solicitous of those who appeared potential counterweights to Nasser. The most striking example, of course, is Jordan, where we have poured millions into an effort to create a viable economy in a state almost without resources. The weakness in this balancing policy has always been the Israeli question. When the Middle East is evenly divided between the revolutionaries and the conservatives, our material interests are reasonably protected. But where Israel is concerned, no Arab leader is secure enough to stand by us while we maintain a posture of favoritism. It seems fair to ask if we might improve our prospects in the Arab world, and indirectly further Israel's best long-term interests, by a more visibly evenhanded approach.

A COMMITMENT ABANDONED

Evenhandedness, of course, is not always easy to attain. At times it is impossible. When Nasser announced the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, there was no middle ground. The U.S. had to accept it or oppose it; we opposed it. Similarly, when an intransigent Arab leader puts us in a position that challenges our commitment to Israel's existence, we have no room for maneuver. But there have been many examples of less inevitable partiality in the past that had already conditioned the Arabs to regard us as completely in the Israeli camp when trouble came. Official government aid to Israel (\$1.1 billion), for example, almost equals that given Egypt over the past two decades—although Egypt has eleven times as many people. In that same period another \$1 billion in private aid, by means of tax-deductible contributions to the United Jewish Appeal, has tipped the balance even more. And while the U.S. Government seldom hesitates to threaten the cutoff of aid when Arab regimes displease us, only at the time of the Suez invasion of 1956 did we use that stick on Israel. Much as we deplored the Israeli attack in June, we did not employ all the pressure available to us to head it off. After the cease-fire, moreover, the U.S. posture in the United Nations was plainly on the side of Israel. However compelling our reasons, we abandoned an unconditional seventeen-year-old commitment—reaffirmed as recently as May 23 by President Johnson—to the territorial integrity of all the states in the Middle East. We also abstained on the Pakistani resolution deploring Israel's take-over of Jerusalem, although we had publicly criticized such action. Not surprisingly, even the more moderate Arabs were outraged.

Some studies of what can be done to restore our badly damaged position are under way in the government, but there is reason to doubt that they are as searching and critical as the situation may require. Early in the crisis, President Johnson appointed a special task force run by former White House aide McGeorge Bundy, giving the impression that Washington was taking a hard new look at our policies. But Bundy has now gone back to his duties at the Ford Foundation and is spending only part time on the Washington project. Officials are at pains, moreover, to deny that any criticism of the past was implied by the task force's appointment. It was designed merely to help coordinate operations related to Middle Eastern problems, they explain.

"OPINION IS A VERY FLEXIBLE THING"

The fact is that Washington policy makers, while they insist they are not complacent, seem remarkably unalarmed. Consoled by what they call disastrous Soviet losses, they discount the view of moderate Arabs that our own losses have been even more severe. They appear to regard Arab emotions as not truly a factor in the equation, or at least as too unreliable to consider in planning future action. Some speak confidently, and even condescendingly, of how fickle those

emotions are. ("Opinion is a very flexible thing in the Arab world," a responsible official remarks. "An Egyptian journalist once told me that it takes three days to change public opinion in Egypt.") They count heavily on the traditional divisions of the Arab world and fear of Communism to send some of its leaders scurrying back to us for aid and protection.

They also recognize the formidable built-in political resistance to any consideration of new directions in American Middle Eastern policies. The overwhelming majority of U.S. citizens neither know nor care anything about the region. Most of those who do care are emotionally partial to Israel, and many of these are effectively vocal in their support. Few of the remainder can or will make themselves heard. Either they are dissuaded by fears of being labeled anti-Semitic, or their small voices are lost in the void of public indifference.

This near-unanimous backing for Israel handicaps U.S. diplomats in the Arab world. In the recent fighting, certainly, Israel benefited from the fact that the Syrians and Egyptians had provoked the crisis and had made noisy threats about their intentions. But the American public's sympathy for Israel has been obvious throughout the little country's history. "There's nothing we can do about that partiality," says a former U.S. ambassador to a major Arab capital. "It's the great embarrassment of the official policy in the Middle East."

The one-sided attitude of the American public, moreover, reflects more than their sympathetic feelings about the Israelis. Americans react negatively to their image of the Arabs as backward, cruel, largely uncivilized desert dwellers—an image, according to one Arab scholar, derived from dimly recalled, badly taught Sunday-school stories and unconscious religious hostility toward Islam. There is no real knowledge to counter the myths. Certainly there is little awareness of the Arabs' illustrious history, a fact that infuriates them. And far too often the Arabs, as some of them admit, have been their own worst enemies. Many of their leaders have offended U.S. voters and their representatives. Extravagant language is much admired in the Arab world, for example, but Americans tend to take it at face value.

On the other hand, we have made no effort whatever to look at the problems of the Middle East through Arab eyes. To do so is to begin to discern the dimensions of their grievances. There are many—not all of them entirely realistic. Many Arabs believe we want the militarily weak and divided, which may well be true so long as Nasser remains the obvious candidate to lead a united Arab world. They suspect we want to retain, through our aid programs and other means, much of the influence of the old colonial powers. They charge that we have brought them into the cold war by forcing Egypt to turn to the Communists for weapons and by labeling neutrality immoral. They complain that our assistance to them is niggardly and motivated not by friendship but by self-interest. These grievances have long existed, but they have been given special force by dramatization of the more serious Arab charge that we are blatantly partial where Israel is concerned. So strongly do they feel about this that many who reject Nasser's charges of direct U.S. involvement in the war regard our financial and diplomatic support of Israel as almost equally reprehensible.

THE IRREPLACEABLE OIL

Only the complaint about Israel is universal. But it has inflamed even basically pro-Western Arabs so much that many are now inclined to endorse the other accusations as well. And the compulsion to strike back jeopardizes, to a greater degree than ever before, our stake in the Arab countries' oil. There is considerable reluctance, on the part of American oilmen no less than government

officials, to make much of this stake in public. They realize that it is all but impossible, in a nation with the popular traditions of the U.S. to suggest that material interests should be weighed along with such human considerations as Israel's welfare. It is senseless, however, not to face up to the very real possibility of the loss of the oil and the implications of such a loss.

In ten years, development of alternative sources of energy could reduce Arab oil's importance drastically. But for now it is quite literally irreplaceable. Even the present partial boycott has created serious hardships for Britain. The added transportation costs and higher prices for substitute oil amount to roughly \$1 million a day. The U.S., whose Arab petroleum imports amounted to only 350,000 barrels a day, has not suffered, but individual American companies have been hurt (see page 86). As a group, U.S. oil firms have a gross investment of nearly \$3 billion (\$1.5 billion net after depreciation) in the Arab lands, and their profits from production there last year amounted to more than \$1 billion.

It is by no means clear what the oil companies' fate will be. The largest Arab oil-producing states, thus far, have not shown great enthusiasm for the total shutdown advocated by some Arab countries. The measures they have taken, in fact, were the least they could do as members of the Arab world. But oilmen still have their fingers crossed. An unhappy executive in Beirut says, "It would be difficult for me to lay a bet on our being here five years from now, and if we are the situation won't be easy."

Yet immediate nationalization of the fields and expulsion of the foreign operating companies is unlikely. The idea has long appealed to many Arab leaders, including some whom the U.S. Government regards as friends. Even splitting the proceeds about sixty-forty with the companies, and selling at the lowest prices in the world (\$1.59 per barrel for Kuwaiti oil compared with \$2.27 for Venezuelan crude), the oil-producing countries take in an estimated \$2.5 billion a year in royalties and taxes from the oil firms. If they could keep all the selling price, and could agree among themselves to raise that price, the wealth generated—for economic development or weapons—would be staggering. Nationalization, however, would be far from easy to carry out. Arab experts agree that all the countries would have to take the step together and this just doesn't seem to be in the cards under the present circumstances.

Even if the countries could coordinate nationalization, they would face the formidable problem of selling their oil. The marketing outlets in the major oil-consuming regions are in private hands. Unless the evicted companies agreed to buy the oil, foregoing their share of the most profitable phase of the business, the Arabs would have almost no place to turn. "It would be very difficult to replace the financial resources of the Western world," admits an Arab petroleum expert.

If nationalization is only a remote threat, however, some form of painful squeeze on the companies is probable. A continuation of the crisis, in fact, seems likely to bring unwelcome changes in the structure of the industry. The French are vigorously seeking to convert President de Gaulle's stance into material advantage by improving their position in the Arab oil fields. And the Italian Government oil agency, E.N.I., which has long coveted access to Arab oil, now seems within sight of its goal. Talks between E.N.I. and the Iraqi Government have been going on since 1961, when Iraq announced the expropriation of about 99 percent of the Western consortium's acreage. Now the Italian Government reportedly is dangleing a \$70-million low-interest loan in exchange for a development contract for E.N.I. American oilmen are resigned to seeing both the

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French and the Italians achieve some measure of success.

It appears certain that the companies will have to settle for a smaller share of the oil revenues. Three weeks after the cease-fire, Beirut's authoritative *Middle East Economic Survey* noted that "Arab oil producing countries, to fulfill their role as financiers of the Arab world, will have to insure a steady increase in their oil revenues, not only in terms of over-all payments but also in terms of per-barrel payments." Even if the situation quiets down, therefore, the outlook is for slimmer profits and more painful headaches in the oil business. And if large-scale fighting should break out once more, with the U.S. sympathetic to the Israelis, expulsion of American firms would be a real possibility, no matter how self-destructive that might be.

WHAT'S GOOD FOR ISRAEL?

In spite of its importance, if our interest in the oil conflicted directly with our concern for Israel, we would probably regretfully have to watch the oil go down the drain. But our stake in both may well call for some shift in our position. A good case can be made that Israel, for reasons easy to understand, has been pursuing a course that is not in its own best long-term interests. It could further be argued that the U.S. has encouraged these unwise policies by failure to view the Middle East from a more dispassionate and balanced position. Thus the U.S. alienated the Arabs and was unable to dissuade Israel from action that may have made its existence all the more precarious. The shock waves from Israel's victory are still sweeping across the Middle East. Ironically, U.S. officials say, they threaten most damage in the very lands that had been most tolerant toward Israel. The tiny Jewish state's long-range security, moreover, may not truly be enhanced by boundary changes or declarations of an end to belligerency or even free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. Ultimately, Israel can prosper only if its Arab neighbors can be reconciled to its presence.

In the long sweep of history the Arabs have a lot going for them. The Western world tends to view Israel even now as the underdog—a tiny Jewish David facing the Arab Goliath. This is true in terms of total populations (2,500,000 Israelis versus 110 million Arabs) and geographic area, but today the Israelis are almost a match for the Arabs in terms of citizens able to play a constructive role in modern society—those in good health, educated, skilled, and possessed of high morale. The Arabs are not likely to remain forever industrially backward, unable to employ the tools of destruction effectively. In spite of many mistakes and setbacks, a remarkable amount of progress has already been made in education in the past decade. By 1990, moreover, the Arabs are expected to number more than 200 million to Israel's six million, at present rates of growth. If the tensions cannot be eased somehow, Israel one day will face overwhelming force. Even protected by nuclear weapons or foreign allies, it will then only be able to emulate Samson and destroy its enemies along with itself.

In spite of this prospect, there has been almost no progress toward defusing the explosive animosity. Israeli policy seems directed above all else at forcing the Arabs formally to admit defeat and, by implication, to accept as settled many issues still outstanding. But viewed in long-range terms, this reverses the logical order of events. First, the issues that divide the antagonists should be resolved; then a formal end to hostilities could follow almost as a matter of course. Arab leaders now find it impossible to acknowledge Israel under duress. And even if they can be forced to do so, their signatures on a peace treaty will never prevent further warfare while the basic causes of Arab hostility remain. After almost two decades of no progress toward reconciliation, Israelis and their American well-wishers should ex-

amine soberly the possibility that a change of strategy could bring better results.

A POSSIBLE NEW APPROACH

It is obviously far easier to criticize past policies than to formulate new ones. There are no dramatic new initiatives to propose, and no one can say with assurance that this or that program will work. But what might offer some hope is a new approach, one that focuses not on securing controversial and possibly unessential Israeli "rights" but on helping the Arabs regain their self-respect. Over the long run, this can be done only by the Arab countries themselves, by means of development that enables them to view themselves as the economic and political equals of Israel. For the shorter term, however, there are at least two offenses to Arab pride that could be eliminated: the unhealed sore of the refugees from the 1948 violence and the presence on Arab soil of conquering Israeli soldiers. By persuading the Israelis to take a generous attitude on these two issues, moreover, the U.S. could demonstrate its impartiality in a way that would strengthen the hand of its own embarrassed Arab friends—e.g., Hussein of Jordan, Faisal of Saudi Arabia, *et al.*

The form and dimensions of the refugee problem may have been altered substantially by the outcome of the fighting. The Israeli forces overran, and now occupy, territory where about half of the refugees lived before the war started. It is impossible to predict how many will end up in Israeli-occupied territory. An undetermined number fled to areas still in Arab hands and, although Israel has agreed to permit some of them to return, it is still unclear how liberal the Israeli Government will be about their repatriation. But it is certain that Israel has under its jurisdiction a large share of the refugees.

There has been speculation that Israel will now move to integrate them into the economic life of the captured lands. In this there may be some wishful thinking. For the west-bank region of Jordan, although already developed to a considerable degree, was crowded before its occupation. It may be impossible to absorb all of the refugees there, and thus far Tel Aviv has shown no willingness to take them back into pre-war Israel. Signs of Arab resistance to Israeli rule in Old Jerusalem, moreover, cast doubt on the assumption that many Arabs will live willingly under the government of Israel. It is conceivable that events may prove to have diminished the refugee problem. On the other hand, it may turn out that the situation has only been complicated further. Certainly the way in which the Israeli-controlled refugees are treated could play a part in determining the future attitude of reasonable Arabs. And the U.S., by insisting on fair and considerate treatment, could help regain its position among these Arabs.

THE "OLD" REFUGEE PROBLEM

But there still remains the "old" refugee issue, which has been nagging the conscience of the world since 700,000 refugees fled Palestine when Israel was established. In nineteen years their numbers have swollen to 1,300,000 and they lived, before the latest fighting broke out, in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip. Some exist in the worst squalor; the luckiest occupy monotonous, crowded, but relatively livable camps operated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. Even they are housed, clothed, fed, and inadequately educated on a daily allowance of 10 cents per person.

The U.S. contributes the lion's share toward their subsistence; it has given \$403 million of the \$599 million donated to refugee care through last year. Private citizens recently formed a Near East Emergency Donations Committee (NEED) to channel additional corporate and individual donations to the agency in the current emergency. Periodically, U.S. officials have attempted to

promote a settlement. Invariably, rebuffs from one side or the other have made us throw up our hands. Israel has attempted to use the refugees as bargaining counters in its campaign to force Arab recognition. The Arabs have seen them as their strongest claim on the decency of the West—their only good card in the propaganda game.

Israel has much to gain from elimination of the problem. Besides being pitiable, the refugees are extremely dangerous. From their ranks have come most of the commando-type raiders who periodically cross into Israel and stage terrorist attacks. It is their presence, as an organized, easily manipulated pressure group, that has kept Arabs of good will at the mercy of lowest-common-denominator politics. If, as Arab extremists suggest, Israel is to be turned into "another Vietnam," it will be refugees who provide the guerrillas.

Working out a detailed plan will be difficult, the more so as such a plan may well face Arab attempts to sabotage it by pressure on the refugees. But it surely is not beyond human capability. Its provisions will presumably have to include acceptance by Israel of a sizeable portion of the refugees as repatriates (although this requirement could perhaps be satisfied by continued occupancy, of Israeli territory by the refugees now there), generous compensation for the others, invitations to many to resettle in the U.S. and other countries, and intensive training designed to make them attractive as human resources throughout the Arab world. If the plan is generous enough, and reasonable enough, it will be extremely difficult for the most intransigent Arab leader to refuse it, standing up indefinitely to the combined pressure of world opinion, his own citizens, and the refugees themselves.

In the excitement of Israel's overwhelming military success, it may be easier to persuade the Israelis to tackle the refugee problem than to give up the leverage of their territorial gains. But it might be well for the U.S. to encourage them to consider withdrawal—and without some of the prior conditions on which they now insist. It is by no means obvious that the terms sought by Israel will really contribute to the future peace of the area and hence to its own ultimate interests. Such a withdrawal might seem a return to the conditions that brought on the fighting, and a pointless abandonment of hard-won fortified defense positions. But it could be argued that the Arab fortifications on the Syrian heights and the massed troops in the Sinai Desert were symptoms, not causes, of the hostility. Arab resentment of Israel's presence—the basic cause of the fighting—has been intensified by Israeli occupation of Arab territory. Some diplomats believe that from its present position of strength, Israel could well afford to hand back some of the land, undercutting Arab charges that it is aggressive and expansionist.

U.S. officials argue that it is too early to expect the Israelis to mitigate their conditions. Internal political considerations make it difficult for Prime Minister Eshkol to do so at the moment. In 1956, American diplomats point out, even under the combined pressure of the U.S. and the Russians, Israeli troops remained four months in the Gaza Strip and at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba before withdrawing. Publicly, however, we have given no indication that we wish to see the Israelis withdraw—except on their own original terms, which American officials concede would be dangerous for any Arab leader to accept. And if we have been active behind the scenes, no effects are visible.

REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

If by whatever means, the immediate crisis can be damped down and the attention of the Arabs directed away from revenge, the prospects for eventual development of the region are good. The impact of the war has,

at least temporarily, revived the goal of unified effort and shown Arab leaders how badly they need to strengthen themselves. If ever a section of the globe cried out for regional development, it is the Middle East. Of the oil-rich countries, only Iraq has the resources to become a balanced agricultural-industrial state. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and Libya combined have about ten million residents, and almost all their land is desert. Yet their oil resources generate tremendous amounts of capital, most of which cannot be constructively employed within their own borders. So great are the returns from oil that the Middle East, given technical assistance and encouragement, could probably finance its own development with almost no foreign financial aid.

Kuwait has for six years shared some of its great oil wealth by way of loans and bank deposits totaling nearly \$700 million. Some expanded version of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, with other oil-producing countries joining in support, is probably the most promising vehicle for development. Dr. Talha Yaffi, economist and general manager of Kuwait Investment Co., has worked out in some detail how such an inter-Arab fund could be financed and the large sums of money that it could provide for development. Under his proposal, all oil-producing countries would be obliged to contribute 5 percent of their oil revenues, to be matched by an equal contribution by the private foreign companies holding the oil concessions. If the organization were started this year on that principle, he says, it would immediately have \$308 million at its disposal. By 1990, he estimates, it would have taken in \$14 billion. Such amounts dwarf the \$3.8 billion in American economic and military aid to the Arab countries over the last decade.

Consideration is also once more being given to the establishment of a Middle Eastern Development Bank. From the standpoint of the U.S. this would offer an opportunity to play a direct role in development of the region. Involvement in such a scheme at this time might be difficult to sell Congress, because it could commit the U.S. to large-scale support of programs devised in considerable degree by others. But it would help convince the Arabs that we are not determined to force an American solution to Middle Eastern economic problems.

IRRIGATION AND ELECTRICITY

Spending all the funds wisely, of course, would be anything but automatic. Planners and developers can be hired, however, and patterns have already been set elsewhere. A notable example is the integrated regional-development program being carried out in Iran's Khuzestan province by the Development & Resources Corp. of New York. Formed in 1955 by David Lillienthal and Gordon Clapp, two former Tennessee Valley Authority chairmen, the company has reclaimed 50,000 acres from the desert and plans eventually to turn an additional 200,000 acres into productive agricultural land. Farm output in the province has already increased two and a half times as a result of the large-scale irrigation and hydroelectric-dam systems. Development & Resources is carrying out fourteen other projects around the world, and its officials are more than willing to take on part of an Arab development program.

A dramatic possibility for development is the plan devised by Rear Admiral Lewis Strauss, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and strongly supported by former President Eisenhower. It calls for the construction of three huge nuclear-powered plants to produce electricity and to convert seawater into fresh water. The water would then be used to irrigate thousands of acres of land that is now desert. Strauss estimates the cost of the project at around \$1 billion and has proposed that the U.S. put up half of the initial \$200-million capitalization.

By any standard, the U.S. has a huge stake in the tranquility of the Middle East. As a high-ranking State Department official puts it: "We can't have another one of these wars every few years. It's too costly and it's too damned dangerous." Among other things, this is probably the last war the Arabs and Israel can fight without employing fearfully destructive and sophisticated weapons. The escalation from 1956 is itself sobering.

The obstacles that confront the U.S. in its efforts to play a constructive role are admittedly greater than at any time since it moved onto the Middle Eastern stage, and it will take time to restore our exhausted credit with the Arabs. But the effort must be made. Our own safety is too intimately involved to write off the Arabs. And if we are not to write them off, our policy makers may well have to move visibly into a posture of more balanced friendship with both sides. The war, and our pro-Israeli stance, have cut the ground from beneath those Arabs who were our advocates. If they are to take a public position favorable to us again, we must give them something to rally around. It is equally true that the Arabs will have to respond positively. Our commitment to Israel's existence is not negotiable.

From our own point of view, the beginning of wisdom is to understand that we are in serious trouble in the Arab lands, and that we cannot just wait patiently for them to get over their anger. If we make no moves, our adversaries could win the game by default.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MONROE in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Is there further morning business?

FEDERAL SPENDING AND EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, growing public pressure for new Government services coupled with the inevitable bureaucratic tendency to expand has pushed Federal spending to enormous proportions in recent years. Despite an obvious need for a large part of this budgetary increase commonsense tells us that much of it is wasted. The administration, the Congress, and the American people generally agree that the economic pressures of the Vietnam war require that unessential domestic spending be curbed and that wasteful programs be eliminated.

If significant improvements are to be made, however, this unanimity or purpose must become swiftly translated into action. But unfortunately it seems as though Federal spending is becoming merely a convenient topic of conversation like the weather, with everyone talking about it, but no one controlling it.

Part of the problem here is that detailed information about the strengths and weaknesses of Federal programs that is so necessary for making intelligent budget savings is simply not available.

On January 11 of this year I introduced a bill (S. 47) to develop this much

needed information by establishing a Hoover-type Commission on the Operation of the Executive Branch. This blue-ribbon panel would be authorized to survey the organization and programs of the Federal bureaucracy for a 2-year period and to report its findings and recommendations to the President and the Congress. Forty-one of my colleagues have since joined in cosponsorship of this measure.

More recently a similar proposal (S. 2116) was put forth by the distinguished junior Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF] and cosponsored by 20 fellow Senators. Thus 63 Senators have expressed a desire for such a study.

This evidence of concern is most heartening. For if domestic Federal spending is truly to be limited a thorough review of executive organization and administrative procedures is an absolute necessity. And only a professionally staffed review commission with unstinting official support can perform the complex examination required. Such a comprehensive and integrated study cannot be undertaken directly by the Congress. Its workload is too heavy and its responsibilities too divided. Neither is it likely to be undertaken by the bureaucracy itself, which has a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. A special commission would best be equipped to provide the expertise and devote the continuing attention necessary to get good results.

Mr. President, spending cuts to be effective must be made selectively. And to be made selectively, a great deal of knowledge is required. While such detailed knowledge is not as yet available, enough illustrations have come to light to give ample cause for concern. For example, in recent years the field of manpower development has become a fertile one for Federal bureaucrats. Certainly some federally sponsored programs are needed if the vicious cycle of unemployment and poverty is to be broken. Yet these projects have grown with such abandon that today 15 different Federal departments and agencies find themselves administering 79 different training and education programs. In addition, nine different programs deal with job recruitment and at least five subsidize on-the-job training projects.

Mr. President, illustrations such as these, though provoking as they may be, yield no ready answers. They merely underscore the need for better coordination and less duplication by the Federal bureaucracy. If these situations are to be effectively prevented in the future, a thorough examination of the executive branch is required now. For it is only through such a comprehensive study that genuine long-term improvements can be made. It is far better to forestall unproductive programs than to prune them after they have become entrenched. In fact, if such a review had been inaugurated when this bill was first introduced in 1965, perhaps we would not be contemplating a 10-percent tax surcharge and emergency cuts in Federal spending today.

A poet once said, "The chaos is come of the organized disorder." A brief look at the multitude of overlapping and inefficient Federal programs that have sprung forth in the 12 years since the last